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IN THE SUPRFMF COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
L E A H M. I >ALY, Executrix for
the Estate of Eva Dean Daly,
deceased,
JW . ..,1 tt
'

GEORGE

PI<minit

ana lit s>**>

Case No.
13517

:/^i,r,
iicU'vdn?

.fitil

Appellant.

BR]i!.l< ,, «i« i;i : :\l l C)iNilENT

KMENTSOFFACT
Tin- [mine in question is located ai 1500 iirxaii
Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. I t was purchased in
1952, for the sum of $18,500, T5. Mrs. Daly worked
for a period of 45 years throughout \wv marriage and
retired after the divorce action i t! '^vw commenced,
T6. The daughter, Leah Daly,. \n\\ all of the money
she made as an employee of the Mountain States Telephone Company into the marriage beginning in 1951,
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and continuing through the year 1962, during which
years she contributed to her mother $40,720, T37.
Leah had a partnership during this period of
time under the name of Alta Junior Ski School. Leah
lived exclusively on the funds she received from this
partnership. All of her wages from the telephone company were paid into the account maintained by her
mother and father. Leah also has done all the lawn
work and house painting and cleaning for a period of
21 years, T39.
Appellant was born April 19, 1897, and was 76
years old, not 67 years old as alleged in appellant's
brief, at the time of the trial, T54. Appellant has never
done any of the lawn work, T39. Appellant never did
pay any of the bills, T40. I n addition to the contributions by Leah of her wages during the period mentioned,
she bought with her own funds the wishwasher, a washing machine, dryer, garbage disposal, all the furniture
in the living room, the pictures on the walls, carpet
in living room, dining room and hall, the carpet in
both bedrooms, a double bed and two single beds for
the basement, a color television, all at a cost of $4,200,
T40. She paid with her own money all of these
amounts, T41. Leah also purchased about $40 worth
of groceries each month which she was able to purchase at a wholesale price including most of the meat
consumed in the home which she paid for from her
own funds, T41. I n addition when they would go to
the store for groceries, she would pay for the groceries
from her own funds, T42. Leah and Respondent in
2
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addition to im IU-III^ paid for exclusively by I ;eah purchased *l.ooo worth of drapes which they paid for
Appeii<m,., whose name was on the joint bank
account with ids wife, wrote checks in an amount of
between $100 and $150 per month for his own use from
said joint account, T27.
The decree of the Court awarded the Respondent
the title to the real property, subject to an equitable
lien in favor A the Appellant in the si nil of $8,000,
which was payable $100 per month without interest
commencing the first day of August, 1973. Appellant
received $77 per month retirement from the State of
Utah and at the time of the trial received $227 per
month from Social Security, T54, and $5.00" per month
cost of living increase, T82, plus the $100 per month
which has been paid each month on the equitable lien
on the property making a total of $409.00, per month.
Appellant has medicare and medicard plus he has insurance in the Horace Mann Insurance Company that
pays all the costs of medicines after payment of the
'* * $75.00 each year and the amount of hospital bills
inire does not pay, T12, T70.
Kcsp. . .
>ipmi her retirement on Maivh :>],
. :i, recei
-inn of $212.90 per in<>nlh fix>m Social
urity iu^. , .--MM) p* h-.,-h n-r ;n->nth ;Yont ^n\\
..»Ke City, total $332.90. Ti:j. from which she was
ordered to pay $100 pr» month to (he Appellant to
retire the equitable lien of $8,000 on Uu rr^prr»\
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N F A I L I N G
TO G R A N T D E F E N D A N T S M O T I O N S TO
DISMISS AND/OR MODIFY T H E INTERLOCUTORY DECREE OF DIVORCE
IN
L I G H T OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Defendant's motion to dismiss P38 is based
entirely on the fact that the plaintiff died on September 23, 1973, before the interlocutory decree became
final.
The Utah Supreme Court in the early case of
Parsons -vs- Parsons, 40 Utah 602, 122 P907, @909
held "The cases are applicable upon the points that the
so called interlocutory decree is an adjudication on
merits of all controversies arising upon the issues and
like any other judgment on merits is subject only to
be vacated or modified on appeal . . . or on other proceedings known to the Code for reexamination on
review of a cause on the merits".
The Court in the case of Rasmussen -vs- Call, District Judge 55 Utah 597, 188 P 275 @276 after quoting with approval from the case of Parsons -vs- Parsons
supra held that the decree of August 29, 1919, dissolving the marriage, gave to the plaintiff a real, substantial right, cannot well be questioned. . . . The effect of the interlocutory decree being to vest in plaintiff
certain personal and property rights, it necessarily fol4
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lows that the existence of those rights denies to any
court, the authority or right to take the same from her
except upon legal proceedings in which plaintiff had
an opportunity to be heard in disproof of any attack
upon such rights.... Sufficient cause means legal cause.
In the case of in re Harpers Estate, Anderson
-vs- Harper, 1 Utah 2nd 296, 265 P 2nd, 1005, @1006.
The appeal was taken from a decree of the trial
court determining title to certain real property to be
vested in respondent as the survivor of a joint tenancy.
The question presented was concerned with the effect
of death of one of the parties*
"When the death of one of the parties occurs
after the entry of a divorce decree and before the decree
is final, the decree becomes ineffective to dissolve the
marriage, death having terminated that personal relationship. However, the occurrence of death does not
abate the action itself and to the extent that property
rights are terminated by the decree, it remains effective
and becomes final in the same manner, and at the same
time as one between living persons. (Emphasis added)
The reasoning of the Rasmussen case (Rasmussen
-vs- Call District Judge supra) is applicable to the
instant case. All the property rights granted Fred W .
Harper by the divorce decree vested upon his death,
in his heirs and devisees subject to the statutory limitations of the decree itself and applicable probate proceeding."
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I t is clear that the mere fact of death of the plaintiff, Eva Dean Daly, did not abate the action relating
to the property rights that had been determined by
the Court as part of the interlocutory decree.
The defendant's motion to modify the interlocutory
decree by awarding to the appellant the home of the
parties located at 1806 Bryan Avenue, Salt Lake City,
Utah, and the life insurance described in the decree
P 40. The ground for such modification is described
as "the changed conditions of the parties, growing out
of the plaintiff's death".
The applicable facts are that both the plaintiff
and defendant worked for approximately 45 years and
were at the time of the trial both retired. Their joint
earnings were kept in a joint bank account from which
the appellant withdrew between $100 and $150 per
month for his own use, T27. Leah Daly, the daughter
of the parties, lived with her father and mother. During the eleven years from 1951 to 1962, T37, she was
employed by Mountain Bell Telephone Company and
in her spare time operated the Alta Junior Ski School
as a partnership. During those years she lived on her
earnings from the Alta Ski School and donated the
salary she received from Mountain Bell Telephone
Company amounting to the sum of $42,720, T37, to
the joint account of her mother and father, T37.
At the time of the trial appellant was receiving
$227 per month from Social Security, $77 per month
retirement from State of Utah, T54, and $5.00 per
6
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month cost of living increase, T82, making a total of
$309.00 per month. Appellant also had medicare and
medicade and a policy with Horace Mann Insurance
Company that pays for all medicine after the first
$75 worth in each year and pay the hospital bills medicare does not pay, T12, T70.
The Respondent after her retirement on March
31, 1973, received $212.90 from Social Security, $120
per month pension from Salt Lake City. She had medicare and medicade and a policy with Horace Mann
Insurance Co. for payment of medicines and hospital fees like her husband's policy. After paying $100
per month to appellant on the equitable lien of $8,000,
she had a net monthly income of $232.90.
The Court gave the savings account in First
Security Bank to the appellant amounting to approximately $300 and the family automobile. Mrs. Daly
received the home, subject to an $8,000 equitable lien
in favor of the appellant and the household furniture,
furnishings and appliances.
After the death of the Respondent, Leah Daly
executrix of the Estate of Eva Dean Daly was substituted as party plaintiff and respondent in said action.
The Respondent submits that there has been no
change of circumstances upon which the court should
make any revisions of the interlocutory decree. The
appellant still receives his Social Security in the sum
of $227.00 per month plus an increase of 11% during
7
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the year of 1974. H e still receives the pension in the
sum of $77 per month from the State of Utah and
$5.00 per month cost of living increase and $100 per
month from the Respondent on the equitable lien on
the home and will continue to receive the same until
$8,000 has been paid which will be in approximately
71/? years.
The trial court considered the question as to which
party should be awarded the real property and decided
that the appellant, a man of 76 years of age, who had
done no yard or lawn work for the past 25 years and
who was in poor health would be better off with an
equitable lien of $8,000 on the home, payable at the
rate of $100 per month, than to give him an undivided
interest in the real property with respondent.
The Utah Supreme Court in many cases has enunciated its opinion of the advanced position of the trial
judge in being able to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.
In Anderson vs. Anderson, 18 Utah 2nd 286, 422
Pac 2nd 193, the Utah Court said:
"Recent pronouncements of this court, and the
policy to which we adhere are to the effect that the
trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion in
such matters and that his judgment should not be
changed lightly and in fact not at all, unless it works
such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a
clear abuse of discretion."
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In Stone vs. Stone, 19 Utah 2nd 378, 431 Pac 2nd
802, the Court said:
"The Findings and Order are endowed with a
presumption of validity and the burden is upon the
appellant to show they are in error . . . accordingly we
recognize that it is the prerogative of the judge to
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and in case of
conflict we assume that the trial court believed the evidence which support the finding. W e review the whole
evidence in the light most favorable to them; and we
will not disturb them merely because this court might
have viewed the matter differently, but only if the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings".
(Emphasis added)
In Jensen vs. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2nd 96 485 Pac.
2nd 673 note one at page 675.
"Even though as plaintiffs contend this Court may
review the evidence in a case of equity, due to the
prerogatives and advance position of the trial court we
look with favor upon the findings and judgment and
do not disturb unless the evidence clearly preponderates
against them", citing
Stone vs. Stone supra
Wiese vs. Wiese, 24 Utah 2nd 236, 469 Pac.
2nd 504.
The interlocutory decree determined the property
rights of the parties, even though the respondent died
before the decree became final. Harper's Estate supra.
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"The decree remained effective and becomes final
in the same manner and at the same time as one between
living persons".
CONCLUSION
W e submit that the law and the evidence abundantly justifies the order of the trial court in denying
the motion to dismiss the action. That the Utah law
is clear that the death of the Respondent did not abate
the action as far as the awarding of property rights to
the Respondent is concerned. That the property rights
vested in the heirs of the Respondent at her death. W e
further submit that there has been no change of circumstances sufficient to justify the amendment of said
decree. The appellant will be adequately taken care
of for the rest of his life under the terms of said decree.
Respectfully submitted,
G R A N T M A C F A R L A N E , SR.
752 Union Pacific Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Counsel for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Two copies of the above and foregoing Brief of
Respondent were posted in the U.S. mail postage paid
and addressed to the Attorney for the Appellant, David
J . Knowlton of Vlahos & Gale, at 312 Eccles Bldg.,
Ogden, Utah, and Horace J. Knowlton, at 214 Tenth
Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and copies thereof were
delivered to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, State
Capital Building, Salt Lake City, on this 4 ^ ~ d a y of
October, 1974.
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